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Abstract
This paper draws on perspectives from co-design as an integrative and collabora-
tive design activity and co-simulation as a supporting information system to advance
engineering design methods for problems of societal significance. Design and imple-
mentation of the Sustainable Infrastructure Planning Game provides a prototypical
co-design platform that leverages the High Level Architecture co-simulation standard.
Three role players create a strategic infrastructure plan for agriculture, water, and
energy sectors to meet sustainability objectives for a growing and urbaninzing pop-
ulation in a fictional desert nation. An observational human subject study conducts
15 co-design sessions to understand how information system features influence design
outcomes. Results show co-simulation facilitates information exchange critical for dis-
covering and addressing interdependencies across role-specific objectives and frequent
data exchange is correlated with achieving joint objectives, highlighting the role of
co-simulation in co-design settings. Conclusions reflect on the opportunities and chal-
lenges presented by co-simulation in co-design settings to address engineering problems
for infrastructure systems and more broadly.
1 Introduction
Pursuit of societally-relevant objectives such as resource security or sustainability presents
a challenge for traditional systems engineering and design methods because no single actor
has complete knowledge of or control over all constituent systems. For example, consider the
link between water and energy resources in infrastructure: despite energy-intensive processes
for water desalination, distribution, and treatment and water-intensive processes for energy
extraction, refining, and cooling, energy and water policies are largely developed independent
of each other (Hussey and Pittock, 2012). Further interdependencies with other resources
such as agriculture and food pose multi-level coordination challenges (Pahl-Wostl, 2019).
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Myopic decisions based on incomplete or inaccessible information can create significant and
lasting harm to natural resources without malice or intent, leading to situations such as the
current global groundwater crisis (Famiglietti, 2014).
Given inherent human limits to knowledge aggregation and centralization of control, co-
design frames design as a social process of “joint inquiry and imagination” by integrating
diverse viewpoints (Steen, 2013). Intertwined with related concepts such as participatory de-
sign, concurrent engineering, and collaborative design, co-design places information exchange
at the heart of problem exploration, definition, and perception, well before conceiving of and
evaluating potential solutions.
Information systems (IS) facilitate interaction and information exchange between design
actors in engineering design (McMahon et al., 2004). While internet-enabled IS have long
been envisioned as a platform for co-design (Li et al., 2004), comparatively few engineering
design activities leverage IS for innovative design processes today. For example, model-based
systems engineering (MBSE) is perhaps the most widespread IS-enabled design process but
is still in its early phases and runs largely parallel to traditional document-driven systems
engineering (Madni and Sievers, 2018).
Going beyond model exchange in MBSE, co-simulation is a modeling technique for dy-
namic information exchange that leverages distributed IS to study a joint problem by com-
posing constituent parts (Gomes et al., 2018). Co-simulation provides a technical foundation
for co-design activities on which participating organizations explore and define the problem
from different perspectives. However, beyond modest adoption in defense, automative, and
aerospace domains, co-simulation remains a novel technique lacking in supporting processes
and theory to support engineering systems design activities at large scales. At the same time,
existing gaming applications that blend participatory co-design and simulation activities do
not leverage co-simulation techniques.
This paper discusses the design and use of the Sustainable Infrastructure Planning Game
(SIPG)1 as a prototypical co-design and co-simulation platform to demonstrate interoperabil-
ity and collect observational data from human studies (Grogan, 2014; Grogan and de Weck,
2016). While based on generalizable constructs, SIPG formulates a strategic infrastructure
planning scenario for resource security and sustainability goals with three role-players that
control agriculture, water, and energy systems. SIPG provides a platform on which to con-
duct human studies to observe design sessions and understand how co-simulation and IS
features influence co-design activities.
This paper contributes to two research objectives. First, it documents the technical design
and development of SIPG as a co-simulation platform that can be generalized to a broad
class of infrastructure system models and scenarios. Second, it generates insights about how
co-simulation influences collaborative design processes based on results of an observational
human subjects study. Contributions from this paper connect insights from the design and
evaluation of SIPG to understand how co-simulation and related IS technologies can facilitate
or inhibit co-design activities for engineering systems.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews background
literature on co-design and co-simulation to identify specific research objectives. Section
1SIPG is available under an open source license at https://github.com/code-lab-org/sipg but cur-
rently requires an HLA runtime infrastructure (RTI) to operate.
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3 describes the SIPG application of co-simulation suitable for behavioral experimentation.
Section 4 describes the design of an observational study to investigate how co-simulation
technology influences collective outcomes and Section 5 presents results, statistical analysis,
and discussion. Finally, Section 6 concludes by revisiting the role of co-simulation in co-
design.
2 Background Literature
2.1 Perspectives on Co-design
Co-design encompasses design activities and processes that generally pursue information
exchange across design roles. Similar to the broader topic of integrated assessment in envi-
ronmental and sustainability literature (Rotmans, 1998), co-design has both analytical and
participatory methods. From a technical perspective, analytical methods perform model,
scenario, and risk analyses to represent and structure scientific knowledge. From a social
perspective, participatory methods draw from social sciences to use expert panels, Delphi
methods, gaming, policy exercises, and focus groups to involve a broad stakeholder set.
Technical co-design in literature refers to simultaneous decision-making across traditionally-
sequential disciplines enabled by a shared model (i.e. variables, objectives, and constraints)
as a type of multi-disciplinary design optimization (MDO) (Allison et al., 2014; Azad and
Alexander-Ramos, 2020). Tighter coupling between decisions allows knowledge in one do-
main to more directly influence another without unnecessary constraints or delay from mul-
tiple iterations, resulting in a more desirable solution.
Concurrent engineering (CE) shares a technical perspective on co-design as an integrated
method to coordinate design activities to achieve holistic objectives but also includes dis-
ciplinary human actors inside the system boundary (Holt and Barnes, 2010). CE broadly
encompasses the team (people), model (shared knowledge), tools, process, and facility for a
design activity (Knoll et al., 2018). Alternative CE strategies seek either to decouple tasks to
reduce time or increase coupling between tasks to improve quality (Eppinger, 1991). While
there is generally no centralized optimizer as in MDO, CE shares a common understanding
of the problem and objectives and relies on integrating roles such as systems engineering to
facilitate activities.
In contrast to technical solution processes in MDO and CE, other perspectives view co-
design as a negotiated solution process between different viewpoints (Dtienne et al., 2005).
Social processes of imaginative creativity and mutual knowledge exchange build on more
than 40 years of participatory design that link the designer with other design actors includ-
ing customers (Sanders and Stappers, 2008) to broaden the set of stakeholders who influence
design decisions (Carroll and Rosson, 2007). Framed as a “process of joint inquiry and
imagination,” co-design connects individual practices, experiences, and knowledge with col-
lective communication, cooperation, and change (Steen, 2013). Co-design activities seek to
overcome barriers to shared understanding at individual, project, and organizational levels
(Kleinsmann and Valkenburg, 2008).
Collaboration is at the heart of co-design activities; however, collaborative design activi-
ties can succumb to complexity if poorly structured (Suh, 2009). Research on collaborative
3
engineering applies results from organization science, social cognition, social choice, and de-
cision science to engineering practice to work towards a common goal with limited resources
or conflicting interests (Lu et al., 2007). Proposed methods for engineering collaboration via
negotiation outline a four-step process to manage social interactions, construct shared un-
derstanding, discourse preferences, and finally attain agreement (Lu et al., 2007). Mediation
may benefit negotiation processes to achieve joint decisions among two or more parties while
maximizing social welfare (Klein et al., 2003).
2.2 Information Systems and Co-simulation
Information systems (IS) are artifacts that extend human cognitive limits, exchange infor-
mation, record mental efforts, and mediate critique and negotiation in design settings (Arias
et al., 2000). Research on computer-supported collaborative design combines broader fields
of computer supported cooperative work and human-computer interaction to study the use
of computers in design activities (Shen et al., 2008). Typical computer support functions in-
clude visualization, cross-disciplinary information exchange, and integrated lifecycle analysis
(Li and Qiu, 2006) and common challenges include interoperability, integration, facilitation,
and change management (Shen et al., 2010).
Model-driven or model-centric design activities leverage IS to capture and exchange disci-
plinary knowledge across team members through a shared system model (Ramos et al., 2012).
Model creation helps facilitate learning by eliciting and formalizing knowledge, synthesiz-
ing new feedback loops to support or refute hypotheses, and sharpening scientific (versus
position-driven) solution skills (Sterman, 1994; Vennix, 1999). However, computer-based
models can also pose barriers due to limited acceptance, insufficient time to complete a
feedback loop, poor user-friendliness, high model complexity, and inflexibility to incorporate
issues of interest (de Kraker et al., 2011).
Alternative IS architectures balance centralized and distributed control over the design
activity (Whitfield et al., 2002). Centralized control exerts strict requirements on modeling
languages, interfaces, or even model co-location which permits more efficient or effective
solution processes (i.e. MDO) but presents practical challenges in participatory settings, es-
pecially across organizational boundaries where cultural or even legal issues may limit ceding
of control. Distributed control schemes push integration requirements to more abstract lay-
ers which brings additional challenges of higher network and processing requirements and
added overall complexity.
Long-running efforts dating to the early phases of CE seek to improve distributed design
by encapsulating, rather than standardizing or unifying, tool data and models (Cutkosky
et al., 1993). The broader topic of model interoperability describes the ability of “multiple
separate entities to interact, collaborate, or utilize each other to achieve higher level goal or
their own goals” and can be applied at multiple levels ranging from technical interconnec-
tivity to programmatic coordination (Mordecai et al., 2016). Increasing degrees of model
interoperability enforce common information exchange protocols, syntax, semantics for static
interactions and shared knowledge of methods, state changes, and overall assumptions for
dynamic interactions (Tolk et al., 2007).
Co-simulation is a technique to couple the execution of multiple simulators to facilitate
dynamic information exchange across disciplines, domains, or organizations (Gomes et al.,
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2018). Co-simulation methods range from acausal continuous time modeling languages which
align constituent models through dynamic equations (Mattsson et al., 1998) to general dis-
crete event frameworks which build on parallel and distributed simulation to synchronize
state and maintain causality across multiple logical processes (Fujimoto, 2000). Current
standards include the Functional Mockup Interface (FMI) (Modelica Association, 2019) for
continuous time simulation and High Level Architecture (HLA) (IEEE, 2010) for discrete
event simulation.
Simulation-based methods for infrastructure systems still face difficulties with sharing
models and data across organizational boundaries, considering both hard and soft infras-
tructure, exchanging mutual dependencies, and validation for novel or unexpected scenarios
(Ouyang, 2014). Co-simulation must overcome differing time-scales and resolutions or fidelity
of component models (Pederson et al., 2006). Each domain carries different assumptions,
data dependencies, and numerical requirements for time step sizes, scaling limits, or com-
putational algorithms that generally limit the adoption of existing domain-specific models
(Rinaldi et al., 2001). Application of standards like HLA for co-simulation has thus far
have been limited due, in part, to industry focus on inexpensive, limited, and disposable
models using commercial off the shelf packages compared to the relatively expensive runtime
infrastructure (RTI) licenses, general-purpose programming language, high complexity, and
limited community of experts for HLA (Boer et al., 2009). Alternative options study simpler
service-oriented architectures for infrastructure modeling with centralized event processing
and significantly reduced functionality (Tolone et al., 2008).
2.3 Simulation Gaming
Applications of simulation to co-design problems where human participants play the role of
decision-making actors can be described as simulation gaming or, simply, gaming (Grogan
and Meijer, 2017). While simulation typically emphasizes technical system behavior that
can be represented with a computational model, gaming emphasizes distinctly human and
social behavior such as cognitive bias, bounded rationality, culture, politics, strategy, ethics,
and morality. Partly an exploratory device and partly an experimental platform, games have
been applied over a substantial history to study a wide range of collective decision-making
problems spanning military tactics, supply chain logistics, international crises, and urban
planning (Mayer, 2009).
A series of “infra-games” developed over the past 15 years apply gaming methods to study
infrastructure planning problems. While each game focuses on a different problem, common
features emphasize collaborative decision-making and strategic behaviors. For example:
1. The Urban Network Game seeks insights to opportunities and threats to developing
urban networks of cities with good transportation connectivity (Mayer et al., 2004),
2. Infrastratego studies strategic behavior in a liberalizing Dutch electricity market and
effectiveness of different regulatory regimes (Kuit et al., 2005),
3. SprintCity studies the interrelations between rail infrastructure and urban development
near stations (Nefs et al., 2010; Mayer et al., 2010), and
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4. SimPort-MV2 demonstrates complexities of a large land reclamation project at the
Port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands (Bekebrede et al., 2015).
Each game uses simulation to a different degree to model the technical infrastructure systems
but all focus on the participatory decisions to either generate insights about a domain-
specific problem (e.g. strategic behaviors in electricity markets for Infrastratego) or develop
generalizable knowledge for a class of problems (e.g. managing complex infrastructure for
SimPort-MV2).
It is important to note that not all games require high-tech IS to achieve simulation ob-
jectives. While computer simulations provide more quantitative data, using simple physical
props such as sponges to represent train positions can facilitate rapid system development
and prototyping (Meijer, 2015). However, for games that do require IS to model complex
systems or collect large amounts of quantitative data, few adopt co-simulation architectures
because of the added cost and complexity compared to a narrow set of gaming study objec-
tives.
2.4 Research Objectives
This section reviewed co-design methods to address complex collective design problems.
Technical solution processes like MDO and CE facilitate integration of constituent systems
using enabling IS technology such as co-simulation. However, existing approaches emphasize
a strong central optimization or systems engineering role that loses efficacy for larger engi-
neering system boundaries with more decentralized authority. Negotiated solution processes
like participatory design and gaming methods facilitate collaboration among independent de-
sign actors. However, existing gaming methods build on technical components contributed
by a principal rather than participants. There remains a gap to understand how IS tech-
nology including co-simulation can provide a stronger technical solution layer for negotiated
solution activities in co-design.
To address this gap and synthesize insights from co-design and co-simulation in a gaming
environment, this paper pursues two research questions:
RQ1. How can existing co-simulation standards be applied to an IS platform suitable for
co-design in the context of infrastructure systems?
RQ2. How do IS features related to co-simulation facilitate co-design activities?
The following sections develop an application case and corresponding co-simulation platform
for a strategic infrastructure planning scenario in a fictional desert nation. An observational
human subjects study investigates how the IS supports co-design activities by administering
and analyzing a series of design sessions and outcomes under varying conditions.
3 Sustainable Infrastructure Planning Game
To address RQ1, this section discusses the design of the Sustainable Infrastructure Planning
Game (SIPG) as a co-simulation platform using the HLA standard (IEEE, 2010). Although
the underlying concepts are generalizable to any infrastructure system, SIPG draws on a
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Figure 1: Urban, Rural, and Industrial regions of a fictional desert nation.
specific design scenario for a fictional desert nation loosely based on contextual features of
Saudi Arabia between 1950–2010. It defines three player roles who exert control over agricul-
ture, water, and energy infrastructure systems with objectives based on multi-dimensional
system attributes. Some objectives are aligned towards collective sustainability objectives
while others are in conflict between roles.
3.1 Design Scenario
The SIPG design scenario is a strategic planning exercise to create a 30-year infrastructure
development plan for Idas Abara, a fictional desert nation with a petroleum-based economy.
The design scenario takes place in the year 1980, as infrastructure pressures mount from
resource demands of rapid population growth and urbanization. Urban, industrial and rural
geographic regions illustrated in Fig. 1 aggregate infrastructure, each with unique population
dynamics and suitability for new infrastructure projects. The urban and industrial regions
can access seawater for desalination, the industrial region has vast petroleum reservoirs, and
the rural region has plentiful arable land.
Viewing the scenario from the driver-pressure-state-impact-response (DPSIR) framework
(Tscherning et al., 2012), driving forces are linked to a rapidly growing and urbanizing popu-
lation. In addition to annual population growth rates exceeding 3%, urban lifestyles increase
per-capita demands for food, water, oil, and, most significantly, electricity (e.g. for air con-
ditioning). Environmental pressures include withdrawals from non-renewable “fossil” water
aquifers and oil reservoirs and increased emissions. The potential impacts of environment
changes are wide-reaching and significant—depletion of water resources has dire consequences
for society (broadly) but also limits efforts to diversify the economy through agriculture. De-
pletion of oil resources can also trigger a financial crisis, as oil exports currently sustain the
national economy. While only a small piece of sustainability, the response considered in
this scenario develops a strategic infrastructure plan to provide necessary resources while
sustaining economic and environmental conditions.
The design scenario includes player roles for agriculture, water, and energy (oil and elec-
tricity) sectors and a non-player role for all other societal activities such as commercial
and residential demands. Players choose when and where to construct and operate new
infrastructure elements to transform or transport resources to meet societal demands. Each
infrastructure element consumes capital expenses during construction and operational ex-
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penses during its lifecycle. An nation-wide budget limit constrains capital expenses allowed
each year.
Co-simulation activities propose new capital projects to supplement existing infrastruc-
ture and simulate resource production and distribution over the 30-year planning period.
Simulation outputs quantify several metrics to inform decision-making. Iterative design and
evaluation helps to uncover coordination challenges in pursuit of four equally-weighted joint
sustainability objectives:
1. Food security as the fraction of demands satisfied by domestic production,
2. Water security as the expected aquifer lifetime at current withdrawal rates,
3. Oil security as the expected reservoir lifetime at current withdrawal rates, and
4. Financial security as the net revenue of all infrastructure systems.
Design conflicts arise from three linked sources. First, interest to strengthen food secu-
rity by increasing domestic food production puts additional demands for irrigation, greatly
diminishing available water resources in non-renewable aquifers. Subsequent efforts to in-
crease desalination capacity greatly amplify pressures on power generation and domestic
oil consumption, diminishing revenue from profitable oil export. Finally, efforts to increase
renewable power generation require large capital expenses that compete with desalination
projects for limited budget capacity.
3.2 Modeling Framework
Co-simulation requires a common interface shared among all constituent systems. This
section briefly reviews the infrastructure system-of-systems (ISoS) modeling framework for
generic infrastructure systems (Grogan and de Weck, 2015) and an implementation using the
HLA (Grogan and de Weck, 2018). The ISoS framework defines contextual, structural, and
behavioral templates to guide constituent model development efforts. The interoperability
interface defines a service contract for necessary start-up, synchronization, and shut-down
procedures to model resource exchanges across system boundaries.
The contextual template defines application-specific constructs for spatial and temporal
boundaries. Nodes define geographic units of aggregation where resources can be freely
exchanged. SIPG nodes represent the three regions (urban, industrial, and rural). The time
advancement strategy defines a common time step duration with several iteration periods
to resolve dependencies. SIPG uses an aggregated one-year time step with four iterative
periods. Finally, a set of resource types describe the substances exchanged between systems.
Key SIPG resources include water, electricity, oil, food, and currency.
Structural templates define infrastructure elements as resource-conveying edges at or
between nodes. Production and storage elements have the same origin and destination while
distribution elements have different origins and destinations. Elements assume a lifecycle
state that transitions between five sequential phases: empty (pre-initiation), commissioning,
operating, decommissioning, and null (post-termination). Additional state variables set, for
example, operational production, withdrawal, or distribution levels during each time period.
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Table 1: Key object attributes to exchange during co-simulation.
Class Attribute Data Type Semantics
Generic Element Name String Unique element identifier
Location String Node location identifier
Currency Flow Float Net annual cash flow (§)
Capital Expenses Float Annual capital expenses (§)
Agriculture System Water In Float Annual demand (MCM)
Food Out (Societal) Float Annual supply (GJ)
Water System Electricity In Float Annual demand (TWh)
Water Out (Agriculture) Float Annual supply (MCM)
Water Out (Societal) Float Annual supply (MCM)
Petroleum System Electricity In Float Annual demand (TWh)
Oil Out (Societal) Float Annual supply (Mtoe)
Oil Out (Electrical) Float Annual supply (Mtoe)
Electrical System Oil In Float Annual demand (Mtoe)
Electricity Out (Water) Float Annual supply (TWh)
Electricity Out (Societal) Float Annual supply (TWh)
Societal System Water In Float Annual demand (MCM)
Food In Float Annual demand (GJ)
Oil In Float Annual demand (Mtoe)
Electricity In Float Annual demand (TWh)
Units: §: fictional currency; GJ: gigajoule; MCM: million cubic meters;
Mtoe: million tons oil equivalent; TWh: terawatt hour
Behavioral templates express four key infrastructure resource functions. Storing or re-
trieving functions add or remove resources from a stored stock or buffer. Transforming
functions convert input resources at the source node to output resources at the destination
node. Transporting functions move input resources at the source node to the destination
node. Exchanging functions transfer resources from an origin in one system to a destination
in another.
Co-simulation only disseminates resource exchanging behaviors across system bound-
aries. The HLA requires a shared federation object model (FOM) to describe the syntax
and semantics of exchanged information and a federation agreement to document required
activities during a simulation execution. As a component of the FOM, Table 1 describes
key object attributes for constituent system elements (all inheriting from a base Element
class). All attributes are aggregated to annual temporal scales and nodal spatial scales. Ide-
ally, supply should meet demand for each resource type, e.g. Food Out from the agriculture
system should equal Food In for the co-located Societal System; however, an iterative con-
vergence process driven by system controllers to optimize production under interdependency
contributes small errors. Grogan and de Weck (2018) provides more details on the HLA
implementation for interested readers.
The resulting system-of-systems model in Fig. 2 includes societal, agricultural, water, and
energy (electrical and petroleum) infrastructure systems at each node. Production elements
transform raw to refined resources at each node. Distribution elements permit movement of
food and oil resources between nodes. Key resource flows supply water to the agricultural
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Figure 2: Societal, agricultural, water, and energy (electrical and petroleum) infrastructure
systems at each node exchange water, electricity, oil, food, and currency.
system for irrigation, electricity to the water and petroleum systems to power pumps, wells,
and desalination plants, and petroleum to the electricity system for thermal generation. The
societal system consumes food, water, electricity, and oil to satisfy demands and stores the
net balance of currency.
3.3 Model Implementation Overview
The co-simulation model contains sector-specific implementations for agriculture, water, and
energy. This section provides a brief overview of the sector-specific infrastructure models
supplemented by details in the Appendix.
The agriculture model controls land allocation for food production and roads to transport
food between regions. Role-specific objectives are:
1. Food security as the fraction of demands satisfied by domestic production,
2. Financial security as the net revenue of the agriculture system, and
3. Political power as the total capital allocated to the agriculture system.
Available infrastructure elements include small and large fields for production and small and
large roads for distribution which are controlled each time step to meet demands at minimum
cost. Food production is constrained by arable land area and available workers as a fraction
of population and requires requires water for irrigation. Regions export surplus food for a
profit and import to meet deficits.
The water models controls desalination plants and non-renewable (i.e. “fossil”) aquifer
stocks. Role-specific objectives are:
1. Aquifer security as the expected lifetime at current withdrawal rates,
10
2. Financial security as the net revenue of the water system, and
3. Political power as the total capital allocated to the water system.
Available infrastructure elements include small, large, and huge desalination plants which are
controlled each time step to meet demands at minimum cost. Deficits in desalination supply
require regions to lift water from aquifers and, when depleted, import at great expense.
Both desalination and lifting require electricity. No transport of water is permitted between
regions due to large pumping expenses.
The energy role composes both petroleum systems (oil wells and pipelines) and electrical
systems (power plants) which are tightly coupled because oil pumping requires electricity
and thermal power generation requires oil as feed stock. Role-specific objectives are:
1. Reservoir security as the expected lifetime at current withdrawal rates,
2. Financial security as the net revenue of the energy system, and
3. Political power as the total capital allocated to the energy system.
Available petroleum infrastructure include small and large well pumps for production and
small and large pipelines for distribution. Available electricity infrastructure for generation
include small and large thermal plants and small and large solar plants. All infrastructure
elements are controlled at each time step to meet demands at minimum cost. Regions export
surplus oil for profit, import oil to meet supply deficits, and use low-efficiency “private”
thermal generation to meet electricity deficits.
3.4 Graphical User Interface
A graphical user interface allows participants to modify the underlying infrastructure system-
of-systems model, execute a co-simulation scenario, and view outputs. Inputs specify infras-
tructure investment decisions (i.e. the type, location, and time to build a new infrastructure
element). Outputs visualize key resource flows and quantify figures of merit associated with
role objectives.
The input panel includes simulation management controls and a list of existing infras-
tructure. Simulation controls initialize and run a co-simulation execution. All three players
must trigger a joint simulation execution before it can start. Figure 3a shows the current set
of infrastructure projects, grouped by location. Players can add or edit new infrastructure
elements, choosing from a role-specific menu of templates in Fig. 3b. Each infrastructure
element displays key lifecycle and operational information shown in Fig. 3c.
Simulation outputs are formatted in numerous plots and visualizations in Fig. 4 which
can be aggregated at the national level or separated by region. Common societal informa-
tion such as sector-specific contributions to net revenue (Fig. 4a) and capital expenditures
compared to the annual budget limit (Fig. 4b) are available to all players. Other sector-
specific information such as net revenue breakdown by source (Fig. 4c), resource sources and
sinks (Fig. 4d), and state of natural stocks such as aquifers and reservoirs are only visible to
individual players. Outputs also quantify role-specific objectives in equally-weighted score
components on a scale between 0 and 1000. See Appendix B for details about objective
metric formulations.
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(a) Simulation State and
Control
(b) Infrastructure Tem-
plate
(c) Infrastructure Element Editor
Figure 3: Input GUI components control simulation execution and edit infrastructure.
(a) Societal Net Revenue (b) Capital Expense Budget
(c) Sector Net Revenue (d) Infrastructure Network Display
Figure 4: Output GUI panels presents societal and sector-specific information for each player.
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3.5 Key Model Assumptions and Limitations
The SIPG design scenario and underlying model has been purposefully simplified to facilitate
short-duration interactive co-simulation design sessions with non-domain experts. Although
many of the underlying concepts are general and could accommodate more realistic or higher-
fidelity models, the following key assumptions limit the direct application of results to real-
world planning.
The driving forces from population and societal resource demand dynamics are fixed and
exogenous to the model formulation. A more realistic population growth model would link
growth rates to a measure of economic performance or environmental state to simulate the
consequences of depleted resources or comparative prosperity of economic booms.
All resource prices are static, homogeneous across regions, and exogeneous from the model
formulation. Price points are approximately based on marginal costs of production. A more
realistic (but much more complex) resource pricing model would establish market conditions
based on supply capacity and demand to determine equilibrium price conditions at each time
step where variation across regions could generate new pressures on infrastructure.
Available infrastructure projects include a fixed set of elements with static properties.
While some properties are based on current technology and physical limits of transforma-
tion, others are fit to establish internal consistency (e.g. return on investment periods). A
more detailed model would allow variable capacities with economies of scale and efficiency
improvements or new technology options over time. For example, the past 30 years have ob-
served tremendous improvements in renewable power generation technologies and agriculture
yields.
The model assumes a centrally-managed “nationalized” infrastructure perspective that is
an over-simplification of any economy. For example, the agriculture system is the sole source
of domestic food and subsidizes imported food at the local price. Two exceptions include
lifted water from aquifers and private electricity generation which both provide resources
without infrastructure but do incur expenses from resource consumption (electricity and oil,
respectively).
Finally, the model assumes deterministic yearly time-aggregated behavior to mitigate
logistical effects of delays and buffers in the economy. This assumes demands to be satisfied
at some point during the year-long period, ignoring seasonal variation, and that constituent
infrastructure can be operated efficiently without surplus resources that must be discarded.
While a finer timescale with stochastic features would help plan for alternative futures, it
adds too much cognitive load when combined with the details of this scenario.
4 Human Subjects Co-design Study
This section discusses the formulation of an observational human study using SIPG as a
co-design platform. In part, this work validates the results of RQ1 to demonstrate how the
proposed co-simulation platform supports co-design activities. Additionally, specific study
objectives for RQ2 seek to understand how IS features support integrative and collaborative
solution processes.
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4.1 Study Objectives
As reviewed in Sec. 2, prior literature identifies methods and processes to improve outcomes
of engineering design through technical integration and social collaboration. Technically-
oriented methods such as MDO and CE generally assume strong central roles while socially-
oriented methods such as participatory design and gaming adopt more decentralized perspec-
tives on design decision-making. Co-simulation and supporting IS provide a mechanism for
dynamic information exchange; however, their adoption in gaming environments is limited
outside the defense sphere.
Applied to co-design, IS facilitate technical information exchange within a social activity.
However, there is limited existing knowledge about how to structure or use IS (including co-
simulation platforms) to facilitate desired outcomes. This study focuses on how information
exchange in co-simulation contributes to group sense-making with an underlying hypothesis
that the tighter coupling and execution synchronization required by co-simulation forces
more participant attention to be focused on group sense-making and negotiation, leading to
more preferred outcomes related to joint objectives. The study design primarily compares co-
simulation to an alternative IS where participants asynchronously exchange interdependent
information.
4.2 Study Design
This study proposes a laboratory-style human subjects study using SIPG as the platform
for a co-design activity. It is structured as a between-subjects study with a design session as
the unit of analysis. Three study conditions (1A, 1B, and 2), each replicated in five sessions,
vary three experimental variables: data exchange mode, design station layout, and joint
objective form.
The data exchange mode determines how player roles exchange technical information.
Figure 5 illustrates two modes used in this study. The synchronous mode (Variant 1) uses
co-simulation such that each participant has local control over system inputs but all three
must simultaneously run a simulation to update outputs. An asynchronous mode (Variant 2)
alternatively uses static input/output files to exchange information. Rather than performing
dynamic data exchanges, resource flows at each time step can be saved in a data file and
manually transferred between design stations using a shared network folder. Participants
retain local control over simulation inputs, execution, and outputs but there may be moderate
discrepancies due to out-of-date information.
In addition to differences in operational data exchange, the physical layout of design
stations varies for the two conditions to reflect contextual factors typically employed for co-
simulation such as co-location. Figure 5 compares the centralized layout for Variant 1 with
the distributed layout for Variant 2. While both conditions have a central table for initial
briefing, the distributed layout has more isolated design stations to approximate barriers to
collaboration. There are no other design process limitations beside the location of design
stations.
To fulfill a secondary objective, the study assigns Variant 1 sessions to either receive joint
objectives in qualitative or quantitative form. The qualitative form (Variant 1B) describes
the four components of joint objectives (i.e. food, water, oil, and financial security) in briefing
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(a) Variant 1: Synchronous Exchange (b) Variant 2: Asynchronous Exchange
Figure 5: The synchronous mode (a) exchanges dynamic data with co-simulation. The
asynchronous mode (b) exchanges static data with files input/output.
materials. The quantitative form (Variant 1A) provides the joint objective in numeric form
that is updated after each execution. Both variants receive role-specific objectives in a
quantitative form.
Study observations record intermediate data during the design activity and outcomes at
the end of the design activity. Automatic computer logs record all intermediate design selec-
tions and associated meta-information such as timestamps after each simulation execution.
Post-processing tabulates process variables such as the time and frequency of data exchange
actions and time series for design inputs (infrastructure decisions) and outputs (objectives).
One data exchange corresponds to a joint simulation execution for co-simulation and new
data file availability from all three roles for the asynchronous condition. Outcome variables
measures the final role-specific and joint objective values which range between 0 and 1000.
Note that objectives cannot be directly compared across roles and should generally be treated
as ordinal, rather than ratio, values.
The primary study analysis investigates whether study conditions (i.e. Variant 1A, 1B,
or 2) contribute to observed differences in process or outcome variables. Additional analysis
investigates correlation between observed process variables such as information exchange
frequency and outcome variables irrespective of the study conditions.
4.3 Study Procedure
Following an IRB-approved protocol, the study recruited 15 groups of 3 participants from a
convenience sample of graduate students without compensation. Table 2 summarizes subject
demographics. Participants were predominately male (64.4%) and 25–29 years of age (71.1%)
with more college education than work experience. Most participants had never interacted
with each other in the past (58.9% of pairs), although a subset (25.6%) interact on at least
a weekly basis. Inspection yields no significant demographic differences between conditions.
Design sessions are scheduled when three volunteers are available to form ad-hoc groups
and are conducted in classrooms. Conditions are assigned in partially-randomized order
with sessions 1–8 randomly assigned Variant 1A or 1B and sessions 9–16 randomly assigned
Variant 2 or 1B. At the start of the session, subjects are assigned a role and color (energy:
red, agriculture: green, or water: blue) and seated on one side of a rectangular design station
with the fourth seat reserved for the researcher. During the design session, subjects remain
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Table 2: Summary of participant demographics.
Variant
Category Value 1A 1B 2 Total (%)
Gender Male 11 8 10 29 64.4
Female 4 7 5 16 35.6
Age (years) 18–24 3 2 1 6 13.3
25–29 9 13 10 32 71.1
30–34 3 0 4 7 15.6
College education (years) 3–4 2 1 0 3 6.7
5–6 1 3 4 8 17.8
7–8 7 4 5 16 35.6
9+ 5 7 6 18 40.0
Work experience (years) 0 3 3 6 12 26.7
1–2 9 9 5 23 51.1
3–4 1 3 2 6 13.3
5–6 1 0 2 3 6.7
7–8 1 0 0 1 2.2
Interaction with other participants Never 19 16 18 53 58.9
Rarely 3 6 3 12 13.3
Monthly 1 1 0 2 2.2
Weekly 5 5 8 18 20.0
Daily 2 2 1 5 5.6
at the central design station for Variant 1 (A or B) or move to satellite design stations for
Variant 2.
Participants may exit the study at any point, however no such events occurred. A
15-minute scripted presentation introduces the design context including the three regions
(industrial, rural, urban), infrastructure within each sector, resource interdependencies, op-
erational behaviors in the simulation model, other assumptions for price and cost, budget and
time constraints, and a description of joint objectives. Subjects also receive a confidential
sheet describing individual objectives and an overview of key issues in their respective role.
Participants may share the confidential information or keep it private. Next, a 15-minute
tutorial introduces the subjects to the software tool including simulation inputs (existing
elements and available templates), execution control buttons (initialize and run), and a
walk-through of all output screens.
After completing addressing any related questions, subjects enter the 60-minute timed
design session period. Subjects are allowed to move about the room and share their display
during the design session but may not move the design stations. Subjects can also ask
the researcher for additional information not displayed in the GUI, clarifications on model
assumptions, or other questions excluding advice on design decisions. The researcher updates
the remaining time at several points during the session. Following the design task, the
researcher leads a de-briefing session to explain the study objectives and probe experiences
and observations from the design session.
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4.4 Limitations and Threats to Validity
This study has several limitations which pose threats to the validity of results. First, it
does not employ a full-factorial design of the three independent variables (data exchange
mode, design station layout, and description of joint objectives). Rather, it only evaluates
the three tool variants (1A, 1B, and 2), limiting the ability to distinguish between the effect
of coupled variables. Additionally, group processes are largely uncontrolled during design
sessions. Subjects are not constrained to follow a particular process for design, nor are there
limits on discussion or sharing of information. Furthermore, there are no imposed preferences
for individual versus shared objectives. This lack of control introduces additional variation
beyond tool variants which may limit conclusions.
This design does not fully leverage randomization of conditions for practical reasons.
Groups are formed as participant schedules allow rather than completely randomly. Potential
biases are partially mitigated by the non-purposeful assignment of conditions to sessions
which are randomly assigned except for Variant 2 which is limited to the second half of
sessions. The ordering effect may bias results due to researcher maturation effects and is
partially mitigated by adhering to a common scripted introduction and tutorial across all
sessions.
Researcher participation in the design sessions introduces additional potential biases,
especially as subjects are sampled from peer groups and the researcher is the developer of
SIPG. Scripted introduction and tutorial materials and passive participation to only respond
to direct questions mitigate some concerns, however the possibility of additional biases must
be acknowledged.
Several factors limit the generalizability of results beyond the design sessions considered.
Previously discussed limitations in the SIPG model and scenario limit direct extensions to
real-world cases. Similarly, the sampled population is not representative of infrastructure
planners, although backgrounds in technical areas may be similar. There are also potential
reactive effects of experimental arrangements. Participants work in ad-hoc teams and are
not required to have background experience with infrastructure systems. Design sessions are
conducted in general-purpose classrooms using unfamiliar software tools that requires a large
portion of the design time to simply comprehend the task. Finally, participants working in
a finite, fictional session may not fully consider the implications of decisions having great
socio-economic impact in the real world.
5 Study Results, Analysis, and Discussion
This section reports results of the observational SIPG study to address RQ2 about how
IS features support co-design activities. An overview first describes the collected data and
overall features and relationships. Statistical analysis evaluates specific hypotheses regarding
the effect of IS variants on design activities. Finally, discussion explains the analysis results
within the context of SIPG and more broadly for co-design for engineering systems.
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Table 3: Summary of design outcomes by session.
Session Assigned Budget Number Role Objective (Rank) Joint Obj.
ID Variant Limit Exchanges Agriculture Water Energy (Rank)
1 1A Over 5 624.6 (7) 352.2 (8) 602.8 (4) 344.8 (1)
2 1A Over 6 657.7 (9) 355.2 (10) 786.9 (14) 497.9 (11)
3 1A Under 10 401.1 (2) 384.0 (14) 578.4 (1) 445.1 (5)
4 1A Under 11 736.3 (12) 342.7 (3) 724.4 (10) 517.1 (15)
5 1A Over 9 570.7 (5) 359.5 (11) 792.3 (15) 486.9 (10)
6 1B Under 12 662.8 (10) 344.2 (5) 779.5 (12) 509.9 (13)
7 1B Over 13 613.4 (6) 312.1 (1) 688.9 (7) 484.4 (9)
8 1B Over 5 654.1 (8) 347.8 (7) 722.4 (9) 466.9 (7)
9 1B Over 7 364.3 (1) 400.0 (15) 584.4 (2) 438.5 (2)
10 1B Under 9 794.7 (13) 353.0 (9) 663.7 (6) 505.8 (12)
11 2 Under 7 711.8 (11) 344.0 (4) 778.6 (13) 514.2 (14)
12 2 Under 3 950.4 (15) 340.4 (2) 600.2 (3) 349.7 (3)
13 2 Under 5 469.5 (3) 378.4 (13) 710.0 (8) 449.3 (6)
14 2 Under 4 489.6 (4) 367.4 (12) 655.0 (5) 467.3 (8)
15 2 Under 7 936.0 (14) 345.2 (6) 742.7 (11) 349.9 (4)
Min 4 364.3 312.1 578.4 344.8
Median 7 654.1 352.2 710.0 467.3
Max 13 950.4 400.0 792.3 517.1
5.1 Overview of Results
Data post-processing aligns all design decisions on a single timeline to normalize asyn-
chronous and synchronous variants. Table 3 summarizes results at the end of the 60-minute
design period for all 15 sessions sorted by variant. Six sessions violate budget constraints in
one or more years, however this alone does not affect numerical results of objective metrics.
Most budget violations are small and isolated to a few years which suggests they could be
alleviated by adjusting planning schedules while achieving nearly identical objective metrics.
Thus, the over-budget condition is considered indicative of time pressure limiting the actions
of the designers and is ignored in subsequent analysis.
A time series plot of role-specific and joint objectives in Fig. 6 reveals several patterns.
The agriculture objective generally initially increases but plateaus or even recedes for some
sessions later in the design period. The water objective generally falls throughout the
period—some sessions observing significant declines due to aquifer depletion events—but
results in a narrow final band of outcomes. The energy objective generally increases mono-
tonically during the session with large variation between sessions. Finally, the joint objective
oscillates for some sessions and only surpasses the initial value for a few sessions towards the
end of the design period.
Time series data suggest underlying relationships between design roles. Spearman rank
sum correlation coefficients in Table 4 computed for all data exchange points (N = 113)
estimate relationships. Agriculture and water roles have negatively correlated objectives,
attributed to irrigation demands on aquifers. Water and energy roles also have slightly neg-
atively correlated objectives, attributed to competition for limited budget capacity for costly
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Figure 6: Time series of role-specific and joint objectives for each session.
Table 4: Spearman correlation coefficients for role-specific and joint objectives.
Objective Water Energy Joint
Agriculture −0.280 0.594 −0.158
Water −0.048 0.204
Energy 0.386
infrastructure projects. Agriculture and energy roles show positively correlated objectives,
likely due to a confounding factor (i.e. both generally increase during a session) as few in-
derdependencies exist between these roles. The agriculture role is negatively correlated with
the joint objective while water and energy roles are positively correlated, highlighting the
potential impacts of unsustainable agricultural expansion.
5.2 Analysis of Outcome and Process Variables
Initial analysis inspects for statistical differences between Variants 1A and 1B. Levene’s test
for equal variance shows no significant difference for joint objective (F (1, 8) = 0.757, p =
0.410) or number of data exchanges (F (1, 8) = 0.340, p = 0.576). Student’s t-test2 assuming
equal variance shows no significant differences in mean for joint objective (t(8) = 0.681, p =
2As the joint objective is ordinal, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test yields a similar result but
without a good estimate of significance due to the small sample size (U is approximately normal only for
large samples).
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(a) (b)
Figure 7: Box plots of (a) outcome and (b) process variables by variant.
Figure 8: Scatter plot of data exchange and final objective metric (numbered by session).
0.515) or number of data exchanges (t(8) = 0.529, p = 0.611). In light of these results,
observations from Variants 1A and 1B are statistically indistinguishable and are pooled for
further analysis.
Figure 7a shows a box plot of joint objectives under Variants 1A/B and 2. Levene’s
test indicates equal variance (F (1, 13) = 0.953, p = 0.347) and Student’s t-test shows no
significant difference in joint objective (t(13) = 1.350, p = 0.200). Additional analysis also
shows no significant effects of IS variant for agriculture (t(13) = −1.108, p = 0.288), water
(t(13) = −0.0003, p = 0.9998), or energy (t(13) = −0.113, p = 0.912) role-specific objectives.
Similarly, Fig. 7b compares the number of data exchanges. Levene’s test indicates equal
variance (F (1, 13) = 1.387, p = 0.260) and Student’s t-test shows a significant difference in
number of data exchanges (t(13) = 2.471, p = 0.028).
Figure 8 compares number of data exchanges versus joint objective rank across all 15
sessions. A locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) line suggests a positive corre-
lation confirmed by the Spearman rank sum correlation coefficient as a statistically-significant
positive correlation (r = 0.534, p = 0.036) between number of data exchanges and final joint
objective rank.
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5.3 Discussion
Analysis results do not show a statistical difference in process or outcome variables for Vari-
ants 1A and 1B which compare quantitative and qualitative objective metric forms. While
unexpected relative to the importance of quantitative objectives in optimization, observa-
tion and debriefing suggest some participants experienced cognitive overload due to the task
complexity, number of output displays, and time constraints which may limit the ability to
benefit from quantitative feedback. Additionally, participants may choose not act on the
joint objective (compared to, for example, the role-specific objective) because it was not ne-
gotiated during the session. Further investigation of this factor may consider simpler tasks
or longer task periods, structured processes to enforce evaluation of objectives, visualizations
to compare objectives across rounds, and group construction of a joint objective during the
design session.
While results do not show a statistical difference in design outcomes between Variants
1 and 2, they do indicate Variant 1 has a significantly higher number of data exchanges
and, across all sessions, data exchange is positively correlated with joint objective outcomes.
These results suggest that co-simulation influences design activities through process-oriented
factors that may not be detectable as outcomes due to the small sample size and large
natural variation. Future work must probe causation between data exchange count and
joint objectives because some other mediating factor such as team dynamics or ability could
contribute to both observations.
Further reflection on observations builds a possible explanation for why data exchange
may lead to better outcomes. The SIPG scenario initially exhibits poor food security which
can unilaterally be improved by the agriculture role. However, agricultural expansion pro-
duces high water demands for irrigation which substantially reduces water security. Further-
more, the water role cannot easily meet high demands with desalination which is limited
to coastal regions and constrained by shared budget limits. Successful sessions identify this
conflict (which is not framed a priori in briefing materials) to negotiate a solution between
agriculture expansion and available water resources. The energy role remains largely inde-
pendent aside from conforming to shared budget limits.
Data exchange provides a participatory venue for problem discovery rather than a techni-
cal solution to a pre-conceived problem. Variant 1 requires data exchange for co-simulation
while Variant 2 permits asynchronous simulation using previously exchanged data. While co-
simulation has higher cost of simultaneous action, it otherwise provides easier data exchange
compared to exporting and importing files. Evidence of narrowing design focus to individ-
ual objectives without co-simulation is supported by the number of simulations performed.
Table 5 shows large numbers of agriculture role simulation executions in two sessions (12
and 15) that have strong role-specific outcomes but poor joint outcomes. This result also
provides some evidence for hill-climbing design strategies where actors may be hesitant to
give up perceived gains during negotiation. However, group sense-making based on iterative
design and evaluation is critical to identify the underlying problem in this design scenario.
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Table 5: Simulation executions in asynchronous sessions.
Session Number Simulations Role Objective (Rank) Joint Obj.
ID Agriculture Water Energy Agriculture Water Energy (Rank)
11 26 18 53 711.8 (11) 344.0 (4) 778.6 (13) 514.2 (14)
12 60 73 31 950.4 (15) 340.4 (2) 600.2 (3) 349.7 (3)
13 19 18 27 469.5 (3) 378.4 (13) 710.0 (8) 449.3 (6)
14 39 19 42 489.6 (4) 367.4 (12) 655.0 (5) 467.3 (8)
15 68 49 38 936.0 (14) 345.2 (6) 742.7 (11) 349.9 (4)
Figure 9: Logic model of SIPG design activity with input, process, and outcome variables.
5.4 Implications for Co-Design
Results of this study provide a few insights for co-design with supporting IS including co-
simulation. Foremost, results suggest that understanding the effects of IS and co-simulation
on design outcomes require a process-oriented perspective to accommodate sources of high
natural variability when working with human subjects and dynamic environments. A logic
model with input, process, and outcome variables can help interpret results and generate
new hypotheses to stimulate further refinement (Kriz and Hense, 2006). For example, a basic
logic model Fig. 9 informed by this work suggests the IS platform with co-simulation allows
higher data exchange counts which, in turn, is correlated with desired design outcomes.
With sufficient evidence for causal links between process and outcome factors, this model
can facilitate technology development by focusing evaluation on process variables. However,
this model needs more refinement because it is clear that more frequent information exchange
is valuable only up to a point based on limited human cognitive resources.
In the SIPG design scenario, co-simulation appears to help broaden focus from role-
specific objectives to the joint inquiry and imagination activities critical for co-design. Re-
quiring simultaneous action to receive outputs presents a higher cost compared to asyn-
chronous simulation but the supporting IS makes dynamic data exchange easier than im-
porting and exporting data files. While this study provides insufficient data to investigate, co-
simulation may also provide organizational benefits of interpreting results as a synchronous
activity. Enhanced information exchange would also be expected to support other design set-
tings where an underlying problem is not well-known in advance or when there are potential
conflicts between participating actor objectives.
Interestingly, outcomes from the SIPG design scenario share some similarities with the
historical case of Saudi Arabia (DeNicola et al., 2015). Agricultural expansion in the 1980s
significantly increased groundwater withdrawals from fossil aquifers. Desalination projects,
while largest in the world, only contribute a small fraction of total water demands. Policy
efforts over the past decade reduce agricultural production and import water-intense products
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as a type of “virtual water” but there remain significant challenges to sustain the rapidly
growing and urbanizing population. Adopting a co-design perspective where roles contribute
domain-specific knowledge in a co-simulation platform could help highlight and creatively
address these types of societal challenges.
6 Conclusion
Co-design spans both technical integration and social negotiation perspectives important to
address engineering systems challenges of societal significance. Co-simulation encompasses
a type of supporting IS that permits dynamic information exchange between design actors.
Co-design benefits from co-simulation as a source of technical information structured within
in a social activity that can make visible issues of shared interest in pursuit of joint objectives.
Co-simulation standards such as the HLA provide a technical means to couple simulation
executions but also require significant coordination to align temporal and spatial scales across
the constituent models. This work adopts a graph-based framework with nodes to aggregate
spatial resources and annual time steps to aggregate temporal behaviors with iteration to
resolve interdependencies. While the framework is generally applicable for resource-centric
infrastructure systems, it does not fully address existing challenges of integrating disparate
spatial or temporal scales and coping with the high cost and complexity of supporting IS.
The model information provided explain the level of detail required to create a similar co-
simulation environment applied to a novel problem.
The SIPG design scenario implements the co-simulation platform using the context of a
strategic infrastructure planning scenario drawing some parallels to Saudi Arabia between
1950 and 2010. Three player roles control agriculture, water, and energy (electricity and
petroleum) infrastructure to satisfy demands of a non-player societal role. A supporting
IS provides project templates and controller logic to set production and distribution at
operational timescales such that players can focus on strategic capital investment and pursuit
of role-specific and joint objectives.
An observational human study using the SIPG platform conducted 15 one-hour design
sessions varying IS features such as replacing co-simulation with a manual file input/output
to exchange dynamic resource information. Despite a small sample size and large variation,
results show data exchange is positively correlated with joint objective performance across all
sessions and the co-simulation platform contributed to higher levels of data exchange. These
results contribute to an early process-oriented logic model that explains how co-simulation
facilitates joint inquiry and imagination critical for co-design.
While the results of this study are limited by the prototypical nature of the SIPG platform
and limited sample size with non-domain experts, they provide initial support for the value
of co-simulation in a co-design setting. Future work should explore alternative IS to support
co-simulation with reduced cost and complexity compared to the expansive standards such
as HLA. Even at relatively low levels of fidelity or detail, co-simulation activities have the
potential to anchor co-design sessions with technical data and contribute to the joint inquiry
and imagination necessary to address critical contemporary issues facing society.
23
Table 6: Societal system node properties.
Resource Variable Description Industrial Urban Rural Units
Population tpop0 Datum time 1980 1980 1980 year
P0 Datum population 3.0 6.0 0.75 million people
Pmax Maximum population 17.5 20.0 4.0 million people
rpop Logistic growth rate 7 6 5 %
Food tfood0 Datum time 1975 1975 1975 year
dfood0 Datum per-capita demand 2300 2300 2300 kcal/day
dfoodmin Minimum per-capita demand 1800 1800 1800 kcal/day
dfoodmax Maximum per-capita demand 5800 5800 5800 kcal/day
rfood Logistic growth rate 20 20 20 %
Water twater0 Datum time 1965 1965 1965 year
dwater0 Datum per-capita demand 175 175 175 L/day
dwatermin Minimum per-capita demand 25 25 25 L/day
dwatermax Maximum per-capita demand 325 325 325 L/day
rwater Logistic growth rate 8 8 8 %
Oil toil0 Datum time 1970 1970 1970 year
doil0 Datum per-capita demand 1 1 1 toe/year
doilmin Minimum per-capita demand 0 0 0 toe/year
doilmax Maximum per-capita demand 9 9 9 toe/year
roil Logistic growth rate 9 9 9 %
Electricity telect0 Datum time 1950 1950 1950 year
delect0 Datum per-capita demand 0.25 0.25 0.25 kWh/day
delectmin Minimum per-capita demand 0 0 0 kWh/day
delectmax Maximum per-capita demand 40 40 40 kWh/day
relect Logistic growth rate 9 9 9 %
Units: kcal: kilocalorie (Calorie); L: liter; toe: ton of oil equivalent; kWh: kilowatt hour
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A System Model Details
This section provides details on the sector-specific infrastructure system models. The nota-
tion E(n) gives the set of infrastructure elements originating at node n ∈ N and E ′(n) gives
the set of elements terminating at node n ∈ N .
A.1 Societal System Model
The non-player societal role generates regional demands for food, water, oil, and electricity
as a function of population. Table 6 defines societal model properties for each node, loosely
selected fit the historical context of Saudi Arabia (in aggregate) between 1950 and 2010.
A logistic growth function models population growth in each region, parameterized by a
datum population P0 at time t0, a maximum long-term population (carrying capacity) Pmax,
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Table 7: Agriculture system node properties.
Variable Description Industrial Urban Rural Units
pilocalfood Price of domestic food (no net trade impact) 60 60 60 §/GJ
piimportfood Price of imported food (net trade deficit) 70 70 70 §/GJ
piexportfood Price of exported food (net trade surplus) 50 50 50 §/GJ
f laborpop Maximum labor workforce participation 4 4 40 %
qland Arable land area 8 10 15 thousand km
2
Units: §: fictional currency; GJ: gigajoule; km: kilometer
and logistic growth rate rp. The population of region n in year t is given by
P (n, t) =
Pmax(n) · P0(n) · erp(n)·(t−t0(n))
Pmax(n) + P0(n) · (erp(n)·(t−t0(n)) − 1) . (1)
A logistic function also models growth in per-capita resource demands, parameterized by
a minimum demand dmin, maximum demand dmax, datum demand d0 at time t0, and logistic
growth rate r. The per-capita demands for resource of type τ in region n at time t is given
by
dτ (n, t) = d
τ
min(n) +
(dτmax(n)− dτmin(n)) · (dτ0(n)− dτmin(n)) · erτ (n)·(t−tτ0 (n))
(dτmax(n)− dτmin(n)) + (dτ0(n)− dτmin(n)) ·
(
erτ (n)·(t−tτ0 (n)) − 1) (2)
such that the societal demand for resource τ in region n at time t is Dsocietalτ (n) = P (n, t) ·
dτ (n, t).
Additionally, the societal system aggregates net revenues from each of the other system
models. Sector-specific revenues include domestic and export sales. Expenses include do-
mestic and import purchases as well as capital and operations costs. The currency stock is
updated at each time step using net revenues from each regional infrastructure
Qcurrency(t+ ∆t) = Qcurrency(t) +
∑
n∈N
(
Qagriculcurrency(n) +Q
water
currency(n) +Q
energy
currency(n)
)
. (3)
A.2 Agriculture System Model
Agriculture system properties in Table 7 define prices for domestic, imported, and exported
food resources and set the workforce participation and arable land area for each node. The
rural region has the largest workforce fraction and arable land area but its low popula-
tion does not demand as much food as other regions, presenting a logistical challenge for
distribution.
Agriculture element properties in Table 8 define two sizes of fields to produce food and
two sizes of roads to transport food between regions. Larger infrastructure benefit from
slight economies of scale. Players instantiate infrastructure from these templates to design
a strategic plan.
The agriculture system is coupled with societal and water systems. Regional food demand
arises from the societal system, Dfood(n) = D
societal
food (n). Water resources required to satisfy
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Table 8: Agriculture system element properties.
Variable Description Sm. Field Lg. Field Sm. Road Lg. Road Units
pcapital Capital expense 100 180 50 300 million §/year
dcapital Capital expense duration 1 1 1 1 year
pfixed Fixed expense 5 9 2.5 15 million §/year
f currencyland Variable expense (field) 50000 45000 – – §/km2/year
qlandmax Maximum land area 500 1000 – – km
2
f laborland Land-labor intensity 60 60 – – person/km
2
fwaterland Land-water intensity 1.5 1.5 – – MCM/km
2/year
ffoodland Land-food productivity 5 5 – – TJ/km
2/year
f currencyfood Variable expense (road) – – 2 2 §/GJ
qtransportmax Maximum throughput – – 2 15 EJ/year
η Transport efficiency – – 92 94 %
Units: §: fictional currency; MCM: million cubic meters; GJ: gigajoule; TJ: terajoule; EJ: exajoule
the operational plan at each node total
Dagriculwater (n) =
∑
e∈E(n)
fwaterland (e) · quseland(e). (4)
The agriculture system controller sets food production and transport levels in constituent
infrastructure elements and determines the quantity of food to import and export at each
node by solving the following linear program:
Find:
quseland(e), q
transport
food (e) ∀ e ∈ E (5)
qimportfood (n), q
export
food (n) ∀ n ∈ N (6)
Minimize:∑
e∈E
(
f currencyland (e) + f
water
land (e) · pilocalwater
) · quseland(e) + f currencytransport(e) · qtransportfood (e)
+
∑
n∈N
(
piimportfood · qimportfood (n)− piexportfood · qexportfood (n)
) (7)
Subject to:
quseland(e) ≤ qlandmax(e) ∀ e ∈ E (8)
qtransportfood (e) ≤ qtransportmax (e) ∀ e ∈ E (9)∑
e∈E(n)
quseland(e) ≤ qland(n) ∀ n ∈ N (10)∑
e∈E(n)
f laborland (e) · quseland(e) ≤ f laborpop (n) · P (n) ∀ n ∈ N (11)∑
e∈E(n)
(
f landfood(e) · quseland(e)− qtransportfood (e)
)
+
∑
e∈E ′(n)
η(e) · qtransportfood (e)
+ qimportfood (n)− qexportfood (n) ≥ Dfood(n) ∀ n ∈ N
(12)
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Table 9: Water system node properties.
Variable Description Industrial Urban Rural Units
pilocalwater Price of domestic water (no net trade impact) 0.05 0.05 0.05 §/m3
piimportwater Price of imported water (net trade deficit) 10 10 10 §/m3
Qaquifer0 Initial aquifer volume 200 150 250 km
3
rrecharge Aquifer recharge rate 0.1 2.2 1.2 km
3/year
bcoastal Coastal access for desalination 1 1 0 –
faquiferwater Lifting aquifer intensity 1.0 1.0 1.0 m
3/m3
felectwater Lifting electrical intensity 0.9 0.9 0.9 kWh/m
3
Units: §: fictional currency; km: kilometer; kWh: kilowatt hour
Net revenues accumulated by regional agriculture systems include revenue from local,
regional distribution, and export sales, resource expenses from regional distribution and
import purchases, and other expenses from capital, fixed, and/or variable costs based on
lifecycle phase
Qagriculcurrency(n) =pi
local
food ·Dfood(n) +
∑
e∈E(n)
(
pilocalfood · η(e) · qtransportfood (e)
)
+ piexportfood · qexportfood (n)
−
∑
e∈E ′(n)
(
pilocalfood · η(e) · qtransportfood (e)
)− piimportfood · qimportfood (n)
−
∑
e∈E(n)
(pcapital(e) + pfixed(e) + pvariable(e))
(13)
where variable costs include operating expenses and consumption of water resources
pvariable(e) =
(
f currencyland (e) + pi
local
water · fwaterland (e)
) · quseland(e) + f currencyfood (e) · qtransportfood (e). (14)
A.3 Water System Model
Water system properties in Table 9 define prices for domestic and imported, water resources,
determine coastal access for desalination, set the initial stock in 1950 and recharge rate
of aquifers, and set resources required to lift water at each node. All three regions have
small recharge rates relative to the initial volume, representative of largely non-renewable
sources. Although aquifers increase in salinity under heavy withdrawal, water quality is
not considered in this model and the aquifers are assumed to produce potable water until
completely depleted.
Water element properties in Table 10 define three sizes of desalination plants modeled
based on reverse osmosis technology. This process is energy-intensive, requiring more than
four times the electricity of comparatively-simple aquifer lifting. Note that even the largest
desalination capacity (0.6 km3/year) represents only a small fraction of the aquifer volume.
The water system is coupled with the societal, agriculture, and electrical systems. Re-
gional water demand arises from the societal and agriculture systems, Dwater(n) = D
societal
water (n)+
Dagriculwater (n). Electricity resources required to satisfy the operational plan at each node total
Dwaterelect (n) = f
elect
water(n) · qliftwater(n) +
∑
e∈E(n)
f electwater(e) · qproducewater (e). (15)
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Table 10: Water system element properties.
Variable Description Small Desal. Large Desal. Huge Desal. Units
pcapital Capital expense 100 250 1000 million §/year
dcapital Capital expense duration 3 3 3 year
pfixed Fixed expense 1.0 2.5 10.0 million §/year
f currencywater Variable expense 0.014 0.012 0.012 §/m3
qproducemax Maximum production 50 150 600 MCM/year
felectwater Water-electricity intensity 5.5 4.5 4.5 kWh/m
3
Units: §: fictional currency; MCM: million cubic meters; kWh: kilowatt hours
At the end of each time step, the water system updates available aquifer stock based on
withdrawals
Qaquifer(n, t+ ∆t) = Qaquifer(n, t)− faquiferwater · qliftwater(n). (16)
The water system controller sets water production (desalination) levels in constituent infras-
tructure elements and determines the quantity of water to lift (from aquifers) and import at
each node by solving the following linear program:
Find:
qproducewater (e) ∀ e ∈ E (17)
qliftwater(n), q
import
water (n) ∀ n ∈ N (18)
Minimize: ∑
e∈E
(
f currencywater (e) + f
elect
water(e) · pilocalelect
) · qproducewater (e)
+
∑
n∈N
(
C · qliftwater(n) + piimportwater · qimportwater (n)
)
where max
e∈E
(
f currencywater (e) + f
elect
water(e) · pilocalelect
)
< C < piimportwater
(19)
Subject to:
qproducewater (e) ≤ qproducemax (e) · bcoastal(n) ∀ e ∈ E(n) ∀ n ∈ N (20)∑
n∈N
faquiferwater (n) · qliftwater(n) ≤ Qaquifer(n) ∀ n ∈ N (21)∑
e∈E(n)
qproducewater (e) + q
import
water (n) + q
lift
water(n) ≥ Dwater(n) ∀ n ∈ N (22)
Net revenue for the water system includes revenue from domestic water production (lifting
water is assumed to generate no direct revenue) and expenses from electricity to lift aquifer,
import water, and capital, fixed, and variable costs based on lifecycle phase
Qwatercurrency(n) =pi
local
water ·
(
Dwater(n)− qliftwater(n)
)
− pilocalelect · f electwater · qliftwater(n)− piimportwater · qimportwater (n)
−
∑
e∈E(n)
(pcapital(e) + pfixed(e) + pvariable(e))
(23)
28
Table 11: Energy system node properties.
Variable Description Industrial Urban Rural Units
pilocaloil Price of domestic oil (no net trade impact) 8 8 8 §/toe
piimportoil Price of imported oil (net trade deficit) 35 35 35 §/toe
piexportoil Price of exported oil (net trade deficit) 30 30 30 §/toe
Qreservoir0 Initial reservoir volume 65 0 0 billion toe
pilocalelect Price of electricity (no net trade impact) 4 4 4 §/MWh
foilelect “Private” generation energy intensity 0.5 0.5 0.5 toe/MWh
Units: §: fictional currency; toe: ton of oil equivalent; MWh: megawatt hour
Table 12: Petroleum system element properties.
Variable Description Sm. Well Lg. Well Sm. Pipe Lg. Pipe Units
pcapital Capital expense 500 875 100 300 million §/year
dcapital Capital expense duration 3 3 3 3 year
pfixed Fixed expense 25.0 87.5 2.0 9.0 million §/year
f currencyoil Variable expense 6.00 5.75 0.10 0.10 §/toe
qproducemax Maximum production 25 100 – – million toe/year
freservoiroil Oil-reservoir intensity 1.0 1.0 – – toe/toe
felectoil Oil-electricity intensity – – 2 2 kWh/toe
qtransportmax Maximum throughput – – 10 50 million toe/year
η Transport efficiency – – 98 99 %
Units: §: fictional currency; toe: ton of oil equivalent; kWh: kilowatt hour
where variable costs include operating expenses and consumption of electricity resources
pvariable(e) =
(
f currencywater (e) + pi
local
elect · f electwater(e)
) · qproducewater (e). (24)
A.4 Energy System Model
Energy system properties in Table 11 define prices for domestic, imported, and exported
oil resources and domestic electricity, set the initial stock of oil reservoirs in 1950, and set
resources required to generate electricity to meet shortfalls. Only the industrial region has
an oil reservoir and supply to the urban and rural regions must use pipelines.
Petroleum element properties in Table 12 define two sizes of wells and two sizes of
pipelines. Although oil refining typically includes numerous feed stock types and output
products, this model assumes wells directly produce consumable oil at a one-to-one ratio
from the reported reservoir stock. Despite large capital and operations expenses of associ-
ated infrastructure, oil production is very profitable due to high export prices.
Electrical element properties in Table 13 define two sizes of plants for thermal and re-
newable generation based on solar photo-voltaic technology. No distribution elements are
available to transport electricity between regions. Thermal generation consumes oil as the
primary operational cost to create electricity and is up to twice as efficient as the default
method used to satisfy insufficient supply. Solar generation has no variable operating ex-
penses but incurs a large initial capital expense and larger fixed operations expenses com-
pared to thermal generation.
In addition to the internal mutual dependency, the energy system is coupled with soci-
etal and water systems. Regional oil demand arises from societal and electricity systems,
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Table 13: Electrical system element properties.
Variable Description S. Thermal L. Thermal S. Solar L. Solar Units
pcapital Capital expense 25 75 100 450 million §/year
dcapital Capital expense duration 2 3 3 3 year
pfixed Fixed expense 0.25 1.50 3.00 13.50 million §/year
f currencyelect Variable expense 0 0 0 0 §/MWh
qproducemax Maximum production 2 10 2 10 TWh/year
foilelect Electricity-oil intensity 0.30 0.25 0 0 toe/MWh
Units: §: fictional currency; toe: ton of oil equivalent; MWh: megawatt hour; TWh: terawatt hour
Doil(n) = D
societal
oil (n) +D
elect
oil (n) and regional electricity demand arises from societal, water,
and oil systems, Delect(n) = D
societal
elect (n)+D
water
elect (n)+D
oil
elect(n). Electricity resources required
to satisfy petroleum system operations at each node total
Dpetrolelect (n) =
∑
e∈E(n)
f electoil (e) · qtransportoil (e). (25)
Oil resources required to satisfy electricity system operations at each node total
Delectoil (n) = f
oil
elect(n) · qproduceelect (n) +
∑
e∈E(n)
f oilelect(e) · qproduceelect (e). (26)
At the end of each time step, the petroleum system updates available reservoir stock based
on withdrawals
Qreservoir(n, t+ ∆t) = Qreservoir(n, t)−
∑
e∈E(n)
f reservoiroil (e) · qproduceoil (e). (27)
Net energy system revenue includes petroleum and electricity sources: Qenergycurrency(n) = q
petrol
currency(n)+
qelectcurrency(n).
The petroleum system controller sets oil production (from reservoirs) and transport levels
in constituent infrastructure elements and determines the quantity of oil to import and export
at each node by solving the following linear program:
Find:
qproduceoil (e), q
transport
oil (e) ∀ e ∈ E (28)
qimportoil (n), q
export
oil (n) ∀ n ∈ N (29)
Minimize: ∑
e∈E
f currencyoil (e) · qproduceoil (e)
+
∑
e∈E
(
f currencyoil (e) + f
elect
oil (e) · pilocalelect
) · qtransportoil (e)
+
∑
n∈N
(
piimportoil · qimportoil (n)− piexportoil · qexportoil (n)
) (30)
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Subject to:
qproduceoil (e) ≤ qproducemax (e) ∀ e ∈ E (31)
qtransportoil (e) ≤ qtransportmax (e) ∀ e ∈ E (32)∑
e∈E(n)
f reservoiroil (e) · qproduceoil (e) ≤ Qreservoir(n) ∀ n ∈ N (33)∑
e∈E(n)
(
qproduceoil (e)− qtransportoil (e)
)
+
∑
e∈E ′(n)
η(e) · qtransportoil (e)
+ qimportoil (n)− qexportoil (n) ≥ Doil(n) ∀ n ∈ N
(34)
Petroleum system net revenue includes revenue from local, regional distribution, and
export sales, resource expenses from regional distribution and import purchases, and other
expenses from capital, fixed, and/or variable costs based on lifecycle phase
qpetrolcurrency(n) =pi
local
oil ·Doil(n) +
∑
e∈E(n)
(
pilocaloil · η(e) · qtransportoil (e)
)
+ piexportoil · qexportoil (n)
−
∑
e∈E ′(n)
(
pilocaloil · η(e) · qtransportoil (e)
)− piimportoil · qimportoil (n)
−
∑
e∈E(n)
(pcapital(e) + pfixed(e) + pvariable(e))
(35)
where variable costs include operating expenses and consumption of electricity resources
pvariable(e) =
(
f currencyoil (e) + pi
local
elect · f electoil (e)
) · (qproduceoil (e) + qtransportoil (e)) . (36)
The electricity system controller sets electricity generation levels in constituent infras-
tructure elements and determines the quantity of electricity to generate from low-efficiency
methods at each node by solving the following linear program:
Find:
qproduceelect (e) ∀ e ∈ E (37)
qprivateelect (n) ∀ n ∈ N (38)
Minimize: ∑
e∈E
(
f currencyelect (e) + f
oil
elect(e) · pilocaloil
) · qproduceelect (e) + ∑
n∈N
C · qproduceelect (n)
where C > max
e∈E
(
f currencyelect (e) + f
oil
elect(e) · pilocaloil
) (39)
Subject to:
qproduceelect (e) ≤ qproducemax (e) ∀ e ∈ E (40)∑
e∈E(n)
qproduceelect (e) + q
private
elect (n) ≥ Delect(n) ∀ n ∈ N (41)
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Electricity system net revenue includes revenue from domestic generation (private gener-
ation is assumed to generate no direct revenue) and expenses from oil for private generation
and capital, fixed, and variable costs based on lifecycle phase
qelectcurrency(n) =pi
local
elect ·
(
Delect(n)− qprivateelect (n)
)− pilocaloil · f oilelect · qprivateelect (n)
−
∑
e∈E(n)
(pcapital(e) + pfixed(e) + pvariable(e)) (42)
where variable costs include operating expenses and consumption of electricity resources
pvariable(e) =
(
f currencyelect (e) + pi
local
oil · f oilelect(e)
) · qproduceelect (e). (43)
B Objective Metric Formulation
This section provides details about the role-specific and joint objectives. Most objectives are
expressed as a time average over the 30-year planning period to mitigate boundary effects.
B.1 Food Security
Food security measures the average fraction of domestic food supply between 1980 and
t > 1980 compared to a desired value of 75%. It ranges between 0 for no domestic food
production in all years to 1000 for at least 75% domestic food production in all years. It is
computed for year t as:
Jfood(t) =
1000
t− 1980
t∑
i=1980
F (i) (44)
where
F (i) =

1 if S(i)/D(i) ≥ 0.75
0 if S(i)/D(i) < 0
S(i)/D(i)
0.75
otherwise
(45)
S(i) =
∑
e∈E
f landfood(e, i) · quseland(e, i) (46)
D(i) =
∑
n∈N
Dfood(n, i) (47)
B.2 Aquifer Security
Aquifer security measures the average expected lifetime of an aquifer between 1980 and
t > 1980 compared to a desired value of 200 years. It ranges between 0 for an expected
lifetime less than 20 years in all years to 1000 if above 200 years in all years. It is computed
for year t as:
Jaquifer =
1000
t− 1980
t∑
i=1980
La(i) (48)
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where
La(i) =

1 if Va(i)/Wa(i) ≥ 200
0 if Va(i)/Wa(i) < 20
Va(i)/Wa(i)−20
200−20 otherwise
(49)
Va(i) =
∑
n∈N
Qaquifer(n, i) (50)
Wa(i) =
∑
n∈N
faquiferwater (n, i) · qliftwater(n, i) (51)
B.3 Reservoir Security
Reservoir security measures the average expected lifetime of an oil reservoir between 1980
and t > 1980 compared to a desired value of 200 years. It ranges between 0 for no remaining
lifetime in all years to 1000 for an expected lifetime above 200 years in all years. It is
computed for year t as:
Jreservoir =
1000
t− 1980
t∑
i=1980
Lr(i) (52)
where
Lr(i) =

1 if Vr(i)/Wr(i) ≥ 200
0 if Vr(i)/Wr(i) < 0
Vr(i)/Wr(i)
200
otherwise
(53)
Vr(i) =
∑
n∈N
Qr(n, i) (54)
Wr(i) =
∑
e∈E
f roil(e, i) · qproduceoil (e, i) (55)
B.4 Financial Security
Financial security measures the cumulative net revenue earned compared to a minimum
and maximum desired values. It represents motivation of a player to operate profitable
infrastructure and ranges between 0 if the lower bound is not achieved in all years and 1000
if the upper bound is achieved in all years. It is computed for year t as:
Jfinancial =

1000 if R(t) > Rmax(t)
0 if R(t) < Rmin(t)
R(t)−Rmin(t)
Rmax(t)−Rmin(t) otherwise
(56)
33
Table 14: Financial Security and Political Power Objective Function Parameters
Sector Financial Security Political Power
R2010min R
2010
max rR I2010 rI
Agriculture 0 §50 billion 5% §10 billion 6%
Water −§10 billion 0 6% §15 billion 6%
Energy 0 §500 billion 4% §50 billion 3%
Joint/Shared −§10 billion §550 billion 4% – –
where
R(t) =
t∑
i=1980
∑
n∈N
Qsectorcurrency(n, i) (57)
Rmin(t) = R
2010
min ·
(1 + rR)
t−1940 − 1
(1 + rR)2010−1940 − 1 (58)
Rmax(t) = R
2010
max ·
(1 + rR)
t−1940 − 1
(1 + rR)2010−1940 − 1 (59)
using sector-specific model parameters R2010min , R
2010
max, and rR in Table 14.
B.5 Political Power
Political power measures the cumulative capital expenses allocated to a sector compared to
a minimum desired value. It represents the motivation of a player to acquire funds from a
limited national budget and ranges between 0 if there is no cumulative capital investment
up to year t and 1000 if the cumulative capital investment exceeds an upper bound. It is
computed for year t as
Jpolitical =
{
1000 if I(t) > Imax(t)
I(t)
Imax(t)
otherwise
(60)
where
I(t) =
t∑
i=1980
∑
e∈E
pcapital(e, i) (61)
Imax(t) = I2010 · (1 + rI)
t−1940 − 1
(1 + rI)2010−1940 − 1 (62)
using sector-specific model parameters I2010 and rI in Table 14.
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